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WAR IN HISTORY 
 







Writing about the Armenian Genocide recently in the London Review of Books, Edward 
Luttwak decried the inefficacy of international humanitarian law: ‘As for the Geneva 
Convention, I spit on it, given all the difference it has made to the fate of the 
Cambodians, Rwandan Tutsis, Sarajevo Bosnians and indeed every beleaguered ex-
Yugoslav population.’2 It is a depressingly familiar lament. Yet has international 
humanitarian law – the modern term for law regulating international armed conflict 
which encompasses both the laws of war and customary international law – proved so 
inadequate?3 What, in fact, has been its changing impact and relevance across the 
twentieth century? This edition of War in History focuses in-depth on this question, 
seeking to analyse specifically how one aspect of international humanitarian law has 
evolved: how the laws of war have affected behaviour towards prisoners in a series of 
                                                 
1 The articles in this special edition were first presented at the workshop ‘Revising the Laws of War: The 
Evolution of Legal Protections for Prisoners of War, Refugees and Minority Populations during Conflict 
Situations, 1900-2011,’ hosted at the London School of Economics and Political Science by the 
Department of International History and LSE IDEAS on 13 June 2011 with the support of the LSE 
Annual Fund. 
2 Edward Luttwak, ‘Sins of the Three Pashas,’ London Review of Books, 4 June 2015, p. 8. 
3 See on the subject of definitions: John Horne, ed., ‘Focus: Crimes against Humanitarian Law: 
International Trials in Perspective,’ special edition of European Review, 14, 4 (2006), pp. 415-419. 
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chronologically and geographically diverse twentieth century conflicts. Of course, such 
a thematic group of articles can never hope to conclusively address the functional or 
moral value of the laws of war: however, by focusing on one issue – prisoner treatment 
– across a series of case studies, ranging from the Japanese occupation in the Second 
World War to the Korean War and the decolonisation conflict in Aden – it becomes 
possible to glean a clearer understanding of how the international legal framework can 
have a cultural influence upon conflict mentalities. This introduction will first outline 
how the laws of war relating to prisoners of war developed and evolved as a result of 
specific historical contexts and why they came to hold such prominence and, second, 
will consider to what degree the articles in this special edition shed light on broad 
structural thematic developments regarding their cultural status and application. 
 
As one of the earliest aspects of warfare to be legally codified in international law, 
during the period of its initial development in the late nineteenth century, the treatment 
of prisoners of war in many ways offers a litmus test of the influence and reach of legal 
cultural norms in conflict situations. The 1864 and 1906 Geneva Conventions offered 
significant new protection for enemy troops found wounded on the battlefield; the 1899 
and 1907 Hague Conventions on Land Warfare set out a series of articles on how 
prisoners of war should be managed, in particular the stipulation which appears in 
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article 4 of both Conventions that prisoners of war should be treated ‘humanely.’4 These 
Conventions were intended to build on the groundwork of existing customary laws of 
war which had already established some basic shared European norms for capture and 
prisoner regimes, and also to work closely with national military law – the text of the 
Conventions was meant to be integrated by signatory states into their military law. 
However, the Hague Conventions in particular presented only largely broad brush 
stroke guidance to captivity treatment which was soon superseded by the challenges of 
the totalising mentalities of the 1914-1918 conflict. By 1916, the major belligerent 
states – Germany, France, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and Russia – were all using 
prisoner of war labour on the battlefield, in many cases under shellfire, placing 
prisoners’ health and safety at risk to a degree that significantly breached the spirit – 
and often the letter – of the contemporary Hague corpus of the laws of war.5   
 
The initial pre-1914 codification of the laws of war, however, focused almost entirely 
upon one category - the combatant prisoner of war – with some additional protections 
offered for padres, medical staff and journalists taken prisoner on the field of battle: 
other kinds of conflict captives – civilian internees or guerrilla fighters, for example, 
which are the subject of two of the articles here by Felicia Yap and Huw Bennett – were 
                                                 
4 Article 4 of the 1907 Hague Convention Annex: Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp#art5, accessed 12/10/15. 
5 Heather Jones, Violence Against Prisoners of War in the First World War: Britain, France and 
Germany, 1914-1920 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
4 
 
excluded from any protection under international humanitarian law until much later in 
the twentieth century.6 The articles in this special edition very effectively reveal the 
diversification of the category of conflict prisoner across this period, and its 
implications, a process only beginning in 1914: international law before the First World 
War struggled to envisage that conflicts would involve more complex prisoner-taking; 
the special cases of journalists, medics and padres set out in the pre-1914 laws of war 
would appear almost quaint in the 1939-45 context where entire populations were held 
captive, interned or deported, including those sent to Gulags or to the concentration 
camp system with its forced labour and death camps. Both the range of potential 
subjects for incarceration in wartime and the mass numbers involved increased 
exponentially from 1914 onwards. 
 
Categorisation mattered because, as the nature of who was being taken prisoner in war 
diversified and expanded across the twentieth century, the applicability of the laws of 
war stipulations to protect prisoners was thrown into question. The decolonisation wars 
that followed the end of the Second World War further highlighted the problems of 
application of the laws of war as they existed at that time: it was relatively easy for 
states engaged in asymmetrical warfare against their own colonial subjects to claim that 
                                                 
6 For further discussion on guerrillas, rebels and other non-conventional fighter categories, see: Sibylle 
Scheiper's Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of the Irregular Fighter (Oxford: OUP, 2015). 
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international humanitarian law did not apply, often either because the term ‘war’ was 
deemed inadmissible to conflicts occurring within the borders of empires rather than 
between states, to domestic unrest or to civil war situations, or because those taken 
prisoner did not fall into the category of the traditional soldier combatant – the guerrilla 
or partisan remained outside the protection of the laws of war as they stood by the 
Second World War and, again during the early wars of decolonisation, despite Common 
article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as its applicability to decolonisation contexts 
was contested. The laws of war are not considered to apply outside of international 
conflict - unlike Human Rights Law. More recently, the problem of categorisation has 
recurred, with the claim that international law regarding prisoner treatment does not 
apply to captives in the ‘War on Terror’: the ‘terrorist,’ as an unconventional fighter 
who eschews international humanitarian law in designing and carrying out unrestricted 
attacks – often without warning on civilian targets – is not entitled to the legal 
protections that international law offers to military personnel serving in national armies, 
so the argument goes. This argument creates a highly circumscribed understanding of 
the ‘laws of war’ – limited in terms of the conflicts it applies to and the category of 
prisoner – which in turn undermines its efficacy, leading sceptics to question its 




This debate as to the efficacy of laws of war is not new. In the interwar period, James 
Garner, a leading academic expert on international law, declared in a lecture that 
although the laws of war had been breached in the First World War that was not the 
essential point regarding their value. The purpose of law was to set out norms and 
demarcate boundaries. What was at stake, in other words, in laws of war was not that 
they were never broken – what law is never breached? Rather it was that they created a 
mentality that limitations on wartime behaviour existed and offered a means of gauging 
how far outside of acceptable practice a state had gone: Garner asked rhetorically ‘what 
character the world war would have had had there been no binding norms upon any of 
the belligerents.’7 It is this functional interpretation of international law – its value in 
setting boundaries and a framework of standards – that proved its main First World War 
usefulness. It is a very different understanding to that of Luttwak, quoted at the opening 
of this introduction, where efficacy lies in the degree to which the law is never broken. 
 
As the twentieth century progressed, to this cultural function of international law was 
added another: the threat, and later effective implementation, of sanctions against states 
which broke those international laws of war to which they had previously signed up; 
this was intended to give international humanitarian law a strong deterrent function. 
                                                 
7 Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 61 Akademie für Deutsches Recht: James Garner Vortrag, R 61/8, 
9. Vollsitzung der Akademie für Deutsches Recht, Sonnabend den 30 November 1935, f.1; ff. 29-56. 
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With the establishment of the International Criminal Court, this process – previously 
trialled in an ad hoc way at the 1921 Leipzig war crimes trials and in 1946 at 
Nuremberg – became permanent.8 Indeed, here history can be seen to have finally come 
full circle to solve an original 1914 problem: as Isabel Hull has argued, one of the 
reasons why the First World War broke out was because there was no effective legal 
way of sanctioning Germany for breaking international law by invading neutral 
Belgium in breach of the 1839 Treaty of London. The only option to chastise 
Germany’s renegade behaviour was military action – with all its dreadful costs. The 
First World War, in Hull’s interpretation, was thus as much about an absence of any 
other means than war to uphold international law, as it was about imperialism, strategic 
power or hegemony.9 For the Allies, the war itself became a fight in ‘defense of 
international law and justice.’10 This helps to explain the interwar obsession with 
rebuilding international law and using it to prevent future conflict: the hopes enshrined 
in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 – in which signatories renounced aggressive war as 
a foreign policy practice – provide a stellar example of the degree of faith placed in the 
idea that more absolutist international law prohibitions on war itself could ‘fix’ the hole 
                                                 
8 Gerd Hankel, Die Leipziger Prozesse. Deutsche Kriegsverbrechen und ihre strafrechtliche Verfolgung 
nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Hamburg, 2003); J.F.Willis, Prologue to Nuremburg. The Politics and 
Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War (Westport, Connecticut and London, 1982); 
Annette Wieviorka, (ed.), Les Procès de Nuremberg et de Tokyo (Caen, 1996). 
9 Isabel Hull, A Scrap of Paper. Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War (Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press, 2014). 
10 Sir Graham Bower cited in Hull, A Scrap of Paper, p. 1. 
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in the functioning of the international system revealed by 1914’s lack of non-military 
alternatives. In many ways this was at the expense of revising the existing laws of war – 
focusing on outlawing war itself became the campaign aim of international law experts 
rather than updating the laws that applied during conflict. Hence the interwar period saw 
only two significant extensions of the existing laws of war – the Geneva Protocol on 
Chemical Weapons, signed in 1925 and entering into force in 1928, and the new 1929 
Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.11 This, despite the glaring fact that both expert 
and public opinion largely concurred that during the 1914-1918 conflict the existing 
laws of war had proved outdated and inadequate and had been subjected to widespread 
breaches.  
 
Of course, these interwar hopes proved a chimera and after another, even greater war, 
with the most extreme breaches of the laws of war, particularly on the Eastern Front, 
establishing sanctions and punishment to impose better adherence to the laws of war 
during conflict returned to prominence in public debate. Trying those responsible was 
emphasised as one way to deter breaches – perpetrators now risked being punished 
retrospectively. Enlarging the protections offered by international law was another, 
partly a belated recognition of the diversification of the category of conflict captive that 
                                                 
11 On the process of drafting the 1929 Geneva Convention see: Neville Wylie, Barbed Wire Diplomacy. 
Britain, Germany and the Politics of Prisoners of War, 1939-45 (Oxford, OUP, 2010). 
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was occurring across the twentieth century: new groups – civilians in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, refugees in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention – now gained specific 
rights, including wartime captivity rights. Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions also gave very minimum protections to individuals in the case of ‘non-
international armed conflict’ – a response to the fact that during the Second World War 
Germany had argued that resistance fighters in occupied Europe had no legal rights and 
could be legitimately eliminated. Common Article 3 was the first major extension of the 
laws of war into the realm of intra-state, unconventional conflict. Its application to later 
decolonisation conflicts, however, would be debated and resisted. 
 
 The laws of war thus coalesced during this period with a larger body of new 
international laws that had a humanitarian purpose –ultimately forming modern 
international humanitarian law. This process of coalescing was a long-term legacy of 
the atrocities of 1939-45 and, in particular, the difficulties in pursuing the perpetrators 
of the Holocaust, who in the war’s immediate aftermath were tried under the new 
category of ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ - an extension of the laws of war tradition that 
ultimately paved the way for the later 1949-51 development of international laws 
explicitly protecting civilians in wartime. Although the term ‘Crimes Against 
Humanity’ drew upon the reference to humanity in the Martens Clause in the 1899 and 
1907 Hague Conventions, the definition of Crimes Against Humanity is based upon 
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customary law, and is not set out in an international convention. Moreover, Crimes 
Against Humanity can occur in peace or war. All of this distinguishes them from the 
international laws of war and their definition of war crimes - which have been set out in 
Conventions and which are specific to international war situations.  
 
Ultimately, the collapse of the ideals of Kellogg-Briand remained unresolved in the 
wake of the Second World War: the paradox that continues regarding international laws 
of war is that they remain virtually impossible to uphold or police without force – in 
other words, to enforce good behaviour in war, bystander states often have to intervene 
militarily. The alternatives – economic sanctions or prosecution of war criminals after 
the event – have become major aspects of our contemporary global international system. 
But they have a poor track record thus far in preventing war crimes occurring in the first 
place.  
 
The three articles in this special edition each explore a key conjuncture in this historical 
process of evolution of international humanitarian law, with regard to the laws of war 
and captivity. Felicia Yap examines to what degree the knowledge of the international 
laws of war affected Japanese treatment of civilian internees in the Second World War, 
a group who lacked any international legal protection. She suggests that with regard to 
internees, Japan did look to the international laws on the treatment of combatant 
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prisoners for guidelines on norms, even though it had not signed the 1929 Geneva 
Convention on prisoners of war. Here chronology mattered – perhaps Yap’s most 
important contribution is to show that Japanese captivity policy did not ignore 
international law completely when it came to designing its civilian internee policies, but 
at certain phases of the conflict was open to the idea of engaging with some of its 
stipulations when it came to setting treatment standards. There was confusion, however, 
as to the degree to which laws designed to protect combatant prisoners of war might 
apply to civilian internees in Japanese control and ultimately, the ruthless ideological 
war of imperial conquest that Japan was embarked upon stifled any engagement with 
international laws of war regarding captivity and led to harsh treatment of internees, 
particularly as material shortages increased. This issue not only arose in Japan: globally 
the Second World War was in many ways a key moment of tension as Geneva and 
Hague laws of war for prisoners of war were not considered applicable to civilian 
captives, leaving them vulnerable to mistreatment.  
 
The article by Neville Wylie and James Crossland explores how international law 
influenced the treatment of prisoners of war in the Korean War – if Yap shows the 
strengths and weaknesses of the existing laws of war in the Second World War in the 
Pacific, Wylie and Crossland discuss the evolving new problems that emerged with 
applying international law with the advent of the Cold War. Cold War politics greatly 
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undermined the idea of a shared international sphere – a universal jurisdiction to which 
international law applied. This ideological fracturing impacted in the extent to which 
international law was able to protect combatant captives in the Korean conflict where 
political indoctrination of prisoners was but one of the war’s breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions.  
 
This case also flags another structural weakness of the laws of war, as they existed at 
the time, which was the civil war scenario. While the Korean War was internationalised 
due to the involvement of multiple nation states, it also encompassed a civil war. 
Throughout the twentieth century the internationally agreed laws of war remained 
applicable to interstate conflict only; they were subordinate to the overriding powers of 
national sovereignty in the case of civil war crisis. As the idea of ‘universal jurisdiction’ 
developed, such a dichotomous distinction between what was legally permissible in 
international and internal warfare became deeply problematic. This was a major 
problem for international humanitarian law after 1945: one thinks of Northern Ireland, 
Sudan, Yugoslavia, and other internal conflicts elsewhere where national regimes 
involved in military conflict could claim international laws of war did not apply to 
prisoner treatment; it also surfaced notably in decolonisation situations as Huw 
Bennett’s article reveals. More generally, the wars of decolonisation after 1945 also 
highlighted that the concept of a modern universal jurisdiction was one which stemmed 
13 
 
from western origins, and it sometimes clashed with pre-existing national or religious 
laws of war, often ancient, for example in Chinese and Islamic traditions, that had 
developed over time and which, in contrast, frequently had a more limited remit, being 
applied specifically within particular cultures. 
 
Finally, the article by Huw Bennett examines the use of torture during interrogation by 
the British authorities in Aden. Here the important role of international law in allowing 
neutral inspectors access to prisoners and providing captives with some possibilities of 
redress through the international media and Red Cross is emphasised. The difficulty 
faced by contemporaries as to whether international law could be applied to captives in 
this asymmetrical colonial conflict situation is examined – those arrested as suspected 
conspirators or terrorists were not traditional combatants and eschewed easy 
categorisation. Moreover the colonial context also opened the door to racialized 
hierarchies and a lack of transparency or legal process for these captives as Bennett 
shows. International protest and investigation – as well as domestic contestation – was 
thus key to forcing the colonial regime in Aden to improve its behaviour. A final key 
lesson that is clear from Bennett’s work, however, is that despite the improvements 
made to detention conditions following such interventions, torture as a method of 
interrogation persisted. Aden thus highlights the growing interaction and 
resulting confusion for policymakers and interrogators between the laws of war and 
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human rights law. For the United Kingdom, Aden thus became the first major conflict 
where a public debate about human rights began to impact on security policy. 
 
All three articles thus chart major historical moments where international humanitarian 
law played a significant role in regime debates as to how to define, standardise, manage 
– and in some cases even mitigate – conflict captivity: the Second World War; the Cold 
War; and decolonisation contexts. The articles show that law – like military doctrine – 
often fights the previous war. If there is a continuum visible here across all three articles 
it is that international law does influence the sense of boundaries in a given conflict – 
perhaps most especially among those states or historical actors who opt to treat captives 
in ways that fall far short of the international cultural expectations set out in the 
Conventions because it makes visible to them the extent to which they are breaking with 
international norms. In other words, the laws of war may not prevent breaches occurring 
but they provide the historical map upon which to chart them. Together the three articles 
also show the continual, and somewhat inevitable, historical pitfalls of the legal 
framework: revised after conflicts to take account of the lacunae that the last war has 
revealed in legal protections, international law cannot ever fully anticipate the new 
unexpected challenges that the next conflict context will throw up. In this sense, any 
laws of war are always going to have inadequacies as it is virtually impossible to 
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legislate in advance for unknown technological, political and military cultural changes 
that may unfold in the conflicts of the future. 
 
Taken as a whole, these articles chart a twentieth century where war captivity was a 
widespread and expanding phenomenon: yet it is one that largely lacks an in-depth 
comparative historiography.12 While international laws of war by the latter half of the 
twentieth century were based on the idea of a universal global jurisdiction, no such 
global approach has been applied to examining captivity comparatively across widely 
varying historical conflict contexts. This special edition aims to open such an approach 
to debate. Indeed a major trend, as illustrated in the attitudes to the laws of war in the 
conflicts covered here, has been their increasingly global reach, not unsurprisingly a 
trend that has grown during the second historical period of globalisation which began in 
the 1990s: from a largely European starting point in the Geneva and Hague 
Conventions, which before 1914 were not applied in colonial wars, the framework has 
increasingly been based on universalist cultural ideals. What these articles show as 
conclusions regarding the efficacy of international humanitarian law is that it needs to 
evolve to be relevant in each new historical context, inasmuch as warfare too is 
                                                 
12 One honourable exception to this is: Laleh Khalili,Time in the Shadows: Confinement in 
Counterinsurgencies (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012) 
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constantly evolving.13 They show that international humanitarian law also needs neutral 
watchdogs to ensure its implementation: the role of the International Red Cross, 
protecting powers and neutral observers all mattered in the conflicts examined here, 
often thanks to their ability to publicise and shame states for not enforcing international 
law. The power of social stigma in an increasingly interlinked and media savvy world 
has some weight in encouraging nation states to abide by norms. For Japan, the United 
States and North and South Korea, and Britain dealing with the Aden insurgency, their 
state’s international reputation mattered; as a result of the laws of war framework from 
earlier in the twentieth century and the cultural prestige that it had successfully attached 
to treating captives well as a demarcation of ‘civilisation,’ prisoner treatment was a 
priority – or at least being seen to uphold good captive treatment publicly was. This 
should not be viewed as a historical inevitability: the shock felt at the images from Abu 
Ghraib, that the United States, which had built its national identity on the concept of 
abiding by the rule of law, could mistreat prisoners, cannot be taken for granted in a 
world where Islamic State has abandoned not only international legal prisoner treatment 
norms, both based on Conventions and custom, but also many of those of Islamic law 
tradition. Here one finds a final essential theme of all three articles: international laws of 
war regarding prisoners interact and shape grassroots attitudes and work best where they 
                                                 
13 Felix Schwendimann, ‘The Legal Framework of Humanitarian Access in Armed Conflict,’ 
International Review of the Red Cross; Humanitarian debate: Law, Policy, Action, themed edition: The 
Future of Humanitarian Action, 93, 884 (2011), pp. 993-1008. 
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build upon a pre-existing local cultural ethos regarding captives. The twentieth century 
saw war prisoner treatment effectively raised through international law to become a 
powerful talisman of a belligerent’s moral status; whether or not the twenty-first century 
will reverse this process remains to be seen. 
